

## Militant Activities and Property Values in Port Harcourt, Rivers State

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### Abstract

*Property value is a function of property characteristics, accessibility characteristics, neighbourhood characteristics and environmental characteristics. Many of the variables determining property value had been well researched into while a few had only been scratched at the surface. Therefore, this study examined the causes of militant activities and their effects on property values in Port Harcourt. In achieving the objectives of the study, questionnaire was administered on the ninety-nine (99) firms of Estate Surveying and Valuation in Port Harcourt out of which sixty-eight (68) was retrieved. Both descriptive and deductive statistical tools were employed in analysing the data collected. Regression analysis, relative importance index (RII) and principal component analysis (PCA) tests were conducted to answer the question on the effects of militant activities on property values. An analysis of  $R^2$  between the neighbourhoods affected and the ones not affected by militant activities clearly revealed that militant activities affected property values in Port Harcourt. The study recommends joint efforts of both the government and oil companies at mitigating the various factors responsible for militant activities in Port Harcourt so as to attract interest of residents to the city as this will result in high demand and attendant increased rental values.*

**Keywords:** Environment, Militant Activities, Property Values, Port Harcourt, Rivers State

### Introduction

The demand for real estate has continued to increase over the years and this has resulted to increase in value ascribed to it. The measure of a property's value is a function of its degree of utility and scarcity relative to comparable utilities (Olusegun 2008). However, there are several other factors influencing property values positively or negatively. Widely accepted factors, which significantly influence property values include the various components of property characteristics, accessibility characteristics, neighbourhood characteristics and environmental characteristics.

The activities of several armed militant groups have cast a huge shadow of doubt on the safety of life, commerce and properties. Although their activities are said to be directed towards fighting for a good cause, the means adopted had caused threats to the lives of residents in such areas. A case in point is the militant activities within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which had caused security threats to oil companies, expatriates and even the natives of the region. Their activities target oil production facilities, oil workers and law enforcement agents and has extended to affect the natives and their properties. Although the activities of all militant groups in the delta have been focused on fighting for a greater share of the country's oil revenue utilized for the development of the region, they however have adopted anti-progressive means such as kidnapping, sabotage, theft, property destruction, and guerilla warfare.

In Nigeria today, many people have lost loved ones and properties as a result of the activities of militant groups, some are yet to find loved ones who have been kidnapped, some still grieve over loved ones that have been killed, people have also lost valuable properties due to bomb attacks attached to these activities. Most people who reside in areas where militant activities are prevalent have lost every sense of security and those in areas where such activities have subsided live in constant fear hoping they never resurface. Bannister and Fyfe (2001) noted that the fear of crime is closely related to densely populated and built environment. Although the reason behind various militant activities may vary from place to place or time to time, its adverse effects on the lives and properties will always be a cause of concern. It is for this reason that the study examined the causes of militant activities and their effects on property values.

### ***Concept of Militant Activities***

Various definitions had been given to the term militancy. The word “militancy” can be understood as the acts of individuals, groups or parties displaying or engaging in violence, usually for a cause, whether religious, political, ideological, economic, or social. Nowadays, the term militant is synonymously used with the term ‘terrorist.’ (Quamruzzaman, 2010). Militancy is a state or condition of being combative or disposed to fight for a cause or belief (Chindah and Braide, 2000). It has also been defined as a violent response by an individual, group or sect in a region, community, state or nation due to claims of underdevelopment, political oppression, religious beliefs and segregation. According to Ashimolowo and Odiachi (2012) the motive is that people want their rights and if they are not going to get it by negotiation, they simply will then have it by violence against the “powers that be”

Hornby (2009) defined militia as an organized group of people comparable to a military force. Quamruzzaman (2010) was of the view that the contemporary sense of the term *militia as* “paramilitary force motivated by religious or political ideology, especially one that engages in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular army” is associated with the US usage in the early 1990s as applied to a number of rightwing groups opposed to gun control and distrustful of the federal government.

In modern times, various movements seek to apply militancy as a solution, or use militancy to rationalize their solutions for issues. But these movements do not share common tactics. Usually, a militant uses violence as part of a claimed struggle against oppression. Quamruzzaman (2010) stated that a militia movement has five dimensions ideology, motivation, mobilization, organization and ritual. This word is sometimes used to describe anyone with strongly held views (e.g., militant christian, militant atheist). A militant person or group expresses a physically aggressive posture while in support of an ideology or a cause. A militant person is confrontational regardless of physical violence or pacifistic methods.

### ***Causes of Militant Activities***

Nkrumah (1978) stated that the nature and cause of the conflict between the ruling class and the exploited class is influenced by the development of productive forces, that is, changes in technology; the economic relations which these forces condition; and the ideologies that reflect the properties and the psychology of the people living in the society.

According to Lamb and Hameed (2012) many militant groups in Pakistan have non-religious motivations for their use of violence. These include secessionists, political sectarians, organized criminal networks, warlords, and tribal militias, among others. The militant groups’ focus are those of concern to the U.S policy maker, which are mostly associated with religious ideologies. They are of the opinion that Islamists have pan-Islamic political objectives, while self-declared jihadi groups see themselves as defending Muslims in Afghanistan or Kashmir against non-Muslims. These categories are not mutually exclusive; for example, some jihadists defend Muslims they consider “good” against those they consider heretics. Are militant activities in Nigeria caused by the same or similar factors identified above? This is question to be answered in the next section of this study.

### ***Causes of Militant Activities in Nigeria***

With various attacks on the Nigerian polity, militia has taken the front burner in the contemporary discourse. Onimajesin (2003) stated that the restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on 29 May 1999 signaled the emergence and continued creation of vigilante groups, ethnic and sectional militias as well as secessionist or separatist groups. Okechuku (2003) identified prominent ones to include O’ odua People’s Congress (OPC), formed in 1994 as a militant arm of Afenifere, a pan- Yoruba group and National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) that were in the forefront of protesting the annulment of the June 12, 1993 general elections.

Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC) was formed to serve as a check on OPC incessant attacks on the Hausa/Fulani population in Lagos and other Yoruba towns. Igbo Peoples' Congress (IPC), a militant arm of Ohanaeze Eastern Mandate in response to, OPC and others that frequently vandalize their goods and properties across the country was formed in 1999. Others are the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante outfit set up by Abia and Anambra State governments to curb criminal activities in 1999, the Egbesu Boys 1998, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 2000, Tiv Militia 2001, Jukun Militia 2001, Ijaw Militia 1999, Itsekiri Militia 1999, and the Militia arm of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) 1992. Odogiyon (2009) opined that the unprecedented emergence of Militant groups is as a result of the dissatisfaction with the structure, operation and power structure under the Nigerian federation.

In the Niger Delta, the grievances of the people against the government and the multinational oil companies provided the impetus for social mobilization often (but not always) along ethnic lines. The foregoing found expression in increase in minority political activity at the elite level, lobbies, the formation of coalitions, and local community agitation for more revenues derived from oil wealth at one end and for resource control at the other. The local peoples' determination to pursue these issues arose from increasing denationalization of the state on a global scale, which has seen the rise of sub state identities being the fulcrum of group rights and citizenship claims. These groups in the quest for their collective, but particularistic interests adopt all techniques including the use of violence (Adejumobi, 2003).

According to Duru (2010) violent agitations of varying magnitude dates back to the pre-colonial era as the politics of oil merchandise produced the first nationalists in the Niger Delta. These were African merchants and rulers who insisted that the trade must bring a fair deal to the area. He said that the agitation continued until the post-colonial era in 1966 when there was a 12 day revolution by Isaac Adaka Boro a Niger Delta indigene who led a small guerrilla army of Ijaw nationals to declare the Niger Delta Republic however at the end federal troops overcame Boro and his compatriots, and they were tried for treason and condemned to death on June 21, 1966. He also identified the Ogoni uprising, which started and lasted between 1990 and 1995 as taking different dimension from Boro as it sought redress in ways which involved mobilized mass action and direct confrontation with the state. Also Ken Saro Wiwa led the insurrection against Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), along with eight others and they paid with their lives on November 10, 1995.

Ekpo (2004) said that the experiences of Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa showed that the political atmosphere, for the greater part of the period during which the country was under military rule, did not present opportunities for a more forceful approach to demands for equity, justice and fair play in the Niger Delta. However, since the emergence of the fourth republic in 1999, agitations in the Niger Delta moved from demands for a fair share of the national cake to the right to have control over natural resources that are found in the area. The governors of the Niger Delta States and the entire Conference of the Southern Governors championed the demand for resource control. This was however laid to rest by the Supreme Court ruling in favour of the Federal Government on April 5, 2002.

Ejibunu (2007) identified the causes of growing insurgency in the Niger Delta as structural deficiency of the Nigerian federation, poverty and high scale deprivation of the means of livelihood, environmental damage due to oil spillage, gas flaring, oil pipeline explosions, lack of development and unemployment, human rights violations, bad governance/corruption such as the divide and rule tactics of oil companies, alleged insincerity of the federal government, killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, struggle for political power, resource curse and agitation for resource control.

Quoting Akanna (2007) "The situation caused many indigenes to feel frustrated that another hope and promise had gone down the drain. It marked the beginning of hydra-headed issue of kidnapping of oil workers. The people, particularly the youth, in their own judgment, now felt that the best way to react was by disturbing the flow of oil. They were of the view that since Abuja would not fulfill its pledges, they too would cripple the source through which oil money flow to the seat of power."

Gilbert (2010) opined that as a result of the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa the Niger Delta people felt that nonviolent tactics had failed catastrophically to persuade the state and the multinational oil companies to proactively settle salient issues of environmental despoliation, degradation, neglect, politics of exclusion and other forms of injustices imposed on them since the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in 1956.

Consequently, after the death of Sani Abacha in 1998 and the subsequent democratization process, youths in the Niger Delta resorted to the formation of armed militant groups for the purpose of advancing the cause of the Niger Delta.

Ojajorutu (2010) was of the opinion that environmental activism and militancy are a direct response to the impunity, human rights violations, and perceived neglect of the region by the Nigerian state on one hand and sustained environmental hazards imposed on local Niger Delta communities as a result of production activities of multinational oil companies on the other. According to him the social movements in the Niger Delta emerged as a result of environmental degradation and political insensitivity of the Nigerian state. The frustration arising from the forceful attitude of the Federal Government and oil companies to bring them to submission underlines their quest for self-determination and autonomy. All they were interested in originally was to be part of the Nigerian state where their rights of existence including opportunities would be guaranteed. The government's perception of these struggles generated a hot controversy, appropriately to the militant issues at stake.

Various authors including Ibaba (2005) identified other factors that have led to militant activities in the Niger Delta as federalism and the politics of revenue sharing in Nigeria, environmental injustices and human rights violation, failure of corporate social responsibility on the part of multinational oil companies, accountability and transparency failures in governance, hegemonic politics and the obnoxious laws that govern the oil industry. The conclusion from the above authors was that it is the prevailing reality in the Niger Delta that has given birth to an environment of perpetual agitations, youths' restiveness, insurgency and general insecurity.

### ***Chronology of Militant Activities in the Niger Delta 2006 to 2008***

**Table 1: Chronology of Militant Activities in the Niger Delta**

<b>Year/Month</b>	<b>Kidnapping</b>	<b>Bombings</b>	<b>Assassinations</b>	<b>Others</b>	
<b>2006</b>	January	4	1	-	Threaten wave of new attacks
	February	9	3	-	-
	March	-	1	-	-
	May	3	-	1	-
	June	15	-	6	-
	July	25	-	-	Seize of Agip Ogbainbiri flow station
	August	21	-	1	Nigerian Army launch crackdown on militants. Soldiers fire from the air.
	October	32	-	-	-
	November	9	-	1	-
	December	9	2	3	-
<b>2007</b>	January	50	1	3	Seize of German Shipping line Baco-Liner cargo ship
	February	8	-	-	Release of those kidnapped in January
	March	3	-	1	Release of some hostages
	April	4	-	2	Release of some hostages
	May	45	3	-	More hostages are released
	June	27	-	12	More hostages are released. Troops kill 12 Militants in a dawn raid
	July	6	-	-	Release of some hostages
	August	1	-	-	Release of one hostage. Militants make a demand or else they restart attacks.
	September	2	-	1	-
	October	13	-	-	-
<b>2008</b>	March	1	-	-	-
	May	2	-	-	-
	June	1	-	20	M.E.N.D. declares ceasefire from attacks, Rival militants in gunfire. Militants call of cease fire
	July	2	-	-	Nigerians flee Niger Delta after Militants threaten to behead people

Source: Authors' Compilations 2013

Militant activities in the Niger Delta can be traced back to 1966 when Isaac Adaka Boro formed the Delta Volunteer Force (DVSF) to confront the Nigerian state till present time. Since then, militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria had been involved in various and diverse activities. Gunmen have abducted over 200 foreigners in the Niger Delta in the course of the various attacks. Most were released in exchange for money. A chronicle of such activities, teased together, from various sources are contained in Table 1.

**Materials and Methods**

The records in the Rivers State Branch of the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers showed that there are 99 firms of Estate Surveyors and Valuers in Port Harcourt, and this constitute the population for this study. The Branch records was adopted instead of the directory dated 2009 which showed that there are only 39 Estate Surveying and Valuation firms in the study area. Descriptive and inferential statistical tools such as frequency and percentages, relative importance index (RII) and factor analysis are used. Relative importance index was used to get a measure and a reasonably reliable actual position of the respondent(s) on the attitude continuum. Under Relative Importance Index measure, variables are rated using a 5 point Likert scale, so as to assist in assessing the significance of each factor. The Relative Importance Index (RII) was evaluated using the following expression:

$$RII = \frac{\sum a_i n_i}{\sum x_j}$$

- where: i= response category index
- x<sub>j</sub>= the sum of j factors 1,2,3,.....N
- a<sub>i</sub>= constant expressing the weight given to the ith response
- n<sub>i</sub>=the variable expressing the frequency of the ith

On the other hand, factor analysis was used to remove redundant (highly correlated) variables from the data file so as to replace the entire data file with a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. This was done so as to select small group of variables from larger set to put objects (people) into categories depending on their factor scores. The different methods of extracting the factors from a set of data include principal component analysis (PCA), principal factors analysis (PFA), image factoring analysis (IFA), maximum likelihood factoring, alpha factoring, unweighted least squares and generalized least squares (Ajibola 2012). Principal component analysis is the most commonly used and that was adopted for this study. It was used to reduce the factors identified to the most important ones by determining the correlation that exists between them.

**Results and Discussions**

In this section, the data collected were collated, analysed and the results are as presented in Tables 2 – 12 followed by the discussions.

**Table 2: Professional Qualifications**

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Fellow	10	16.2
Associate	46	67.6
Probationer	12	16.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Author’s Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 2 contains the professional qualifications of the respondents and it reveals that 16.2% are fellows of the Nigrian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers while 67.6% are Associate members and the remaining 16.2% are probationers. This implies that 83.8% of the respondents (Fellows and Associates) are professionally qualified to practice as Estate Surveyors and Valuers whose professional judgment can be relied upon.

Table 3 contains the years of experience of the respondent Estate Surveyors and Valuers. The table shows that 19.1% have worked for less than 5 years, 51.5% have worked for between 5and 10 years, while 29.4% have worked for between 10 years and above. With about 80.9% of the respondents having more than 5 years working experience implies that the respondents are experienced, competent and knowledgeable enough to supply reliable, adequate and up to date data needed for this study.

**Table 3: Years of Experience**

Experience	Frequency	Percentage
Less than 5 years	13	19.1
5-10 years	35	51.5
10 years and above	20	29.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

**Table 4: Do you Let or Sell Properties in Areas Affected by Militant Activities?**

Opinion	Frequency	Percent
Yes	57	83.8
No	11	16.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 4 shows that 83.8% of the respondents (Estate Surveyors and Valuers) have let or sold properties in those areas of Port Harcourt City affected by militant activities while the remaining 16.2% do not have properties in the areas affected by Militant Activities.

**Table 5: Was it Difficult to get Properties disposed in Areas Affected By Militant Activities?**

Opinion	Frequency	Percent
Yes	57	83.8
No	11	16.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 5 reveals that 83.8% of the respondents admitted to have faced difficulties in getting properties disposed in the areas affected by militant activities, while the remaining 16.2% did not experience any challenge. This however shows that militant activities has made it difficult for properties to be disposed either by sale or letting. Comparing table 4 with table 5, it could mean that respondents who have no properties to let or for sale in areas affected by militant activities are the ones who had no challenge in getting thier properties disposed off.

**Table 6: Rental Values in Areas affected by Militant Activites and Areas not affected by Militant Activites**

Rental Values in Areas not Affected by Militant Activities						
Years	4bedroom detached house	3bedroom mflat	2bedroom flat	5bedroom detached house	4bedroom terraced house	Self contained units
2005	900000	400000	200000	1200000	1000000	60000
2006	950000	400000	250000	1200000	1100000	60000
2007	1000000	450000	250000	1400000	1000000	70000
2008	1200000	500000	300000	1500000	1200000	70000
2009	1300000	500000	300000	1500000	1400000	80000
2010	1400000	600000	320000	2000000	1600000	100000
2011	1700000	650000	350000	2500000	1800000	120000
2012	2500000	700000	400000	3000000	2000000	150000
Rental Values in Areas Affected by Militant Activities						
Years	4bedroom Detached house	3bedroom flat	2bedroom flat	5bedroom detached house	4bedroom terraced house	Self contained units
2005	1000000	400000	200000	1200000	900000	60000
2006	900000	350000	150000	1000000	850000	60000
2007	900000	300000	150000	800000	800000	70000
2008	800000	300000	150000	1000000	800000	70000
2009	800000	300000	150000	1000000	800000	80000
2010	1200000	500000	200000	1500000	900000	100000
2011	1500000	500000	250000	1800000	1000000	120000
2012	1800000	600000	300000	2000000	1200000	130000

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

The Table 6 shows the different types of properties in the areas affected by militant activities and area not affected activities. The table reveals that prior to disturbance by militant activities (2005), rental values in the tow neighbourhoods were the same. During the period of disturbance (2006 – 2009), a remarkable difference was manifested in the rental values from the two neighbourhoods. However, after the disturbance, rental values began to pick up in the areas affected by militant activities but not as high as those of the areas not affected by the disturbance. It can therefore be concluded that militant activities affected property values in the study area.

Figs 1 and 2 give graphical demonstration of trends in rental values in areas affected by militant activities and areas not affected by militant activities.




Fig 1: Rental Analysis in Areas Affected by Militant Activities

Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013.

Fig 1 shows the trends in rental values in areas affected by militant activities. From the graph it is obvious that the effects on rental values varies amongst the various housing types in the study area.

From the table it can be seen that before the violent activities of militant groups became rampant (2005) the rental values were higher than during the period when the violent activities of militant groups started (2006 – 2009), and after the activities subsided around 2010 the rental values began to increase again and started to stabilize. This shows that the drop in rental values and subsequent increase can be attributed to the militant activities in that area.




Fig 2: Rental Analysis in Areas not Affected by Militant Activities

Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013.

Fig 2 shows the rental values in areas not affected by militant activities between the period of 2005 and 2012. The graph reveals that rental values continued to rise from during the period under examination. This shows that properties in this area were not affected by militant activities.

Table 7: R<sup>2</sup> of the Various Regression lines in Areas Affected and Not Affected by Militant Activities.

PROPERTY TYPE	AREAS AFFECTED BY MILITANT ACTIVITIES (R <sup>2</sup> )	AREAS NOT AFFECTED BY MILITANT ACTIVITIES(R <sup>2</sup> )
5 Bedroom detached house	0.6226	0.8585
4 Bedroom detached house	0.5784	0.8041
4 Bedroom terraced house	0.4468	0.9219
3 Bedroom flat	0.4883	0.9550
2 Bedroom flat	0.4889	0.9537
Self contained unit	0.9089	0.8665

Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 7 contains a comparison of regression lines (R<sup>2</sup>) of rental values in both neighbourhoods.

The table shows that properties in areas not affected by militant activities have higher  $R^2$  as against those of the areas affected by militant activities. All the properties except the self contained units have greater  $R^2$  than properties in areas affected by militant activities. This shows that the rental values of self contained units in the study area are not affected by militant activities while all other property types are affected by militant activities. It can therefore be concluded that militant activities affected property values in study area.

**Table 8: Causes of Militant Activities in Port Harcourt City**

Factors	Yes	No
Hostility in the Niger Delta	54 (79.4%)	14 (20.6%)
Underdevelopment and Unemployment	65 (95.6%)	3 (4.4%)
Environmental Damage due to Oil Spillage	41 (60.3%)	27 (39.7%)
Human Rights Violation	54 (79.4%)	14 (20.6%)
Bad Governance/ Corruption	55 (80.9%)	13 (19.1%)
Religious Matters	1 (1.5%)	67 (98.5%)
Racism	2 (2.9%)	66 (97.1%)
Ethno Social Crisis	8 (11.8%)	60 (88.2%)
Struggle for Political Power	51 (75.0%)	17 (25.0%)
Agitation For Resource control	55 (80.9%)	13 (19.1%)

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

The factors responsible for militant activities in Port Harcourt city are contained in table 8. Underdevelopment and unemployment (95.6%) is the major cause of militant activities in the study area. This was followed by bad governance/corruption and agitation for resource control (80.9% respectively). Other factors include hostility in the Niger Delta and human rights violation (79.4% respectively), struggle for political power (75.0%), environmental damage due to oil spillage (60.3 %), ethno social crisis (11.8%), racism (2.9%) and religious matters (1.5%). From this it can be said that underdevelopment and unemployment, agitation for resource control, bad governance/corruption, hostility in the Niger Delta, human rights violation and struggle for political power are the major causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt.

**Table 9: Ranking of Causes of Militant Activities in Port Harcourt**

Factors	Very Important 5	Important 4	Undecided 3	Not Very Important 2	Not Important 1	Total	RII	Rank
Hostility in the Niger Delta	33 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 165	21 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 84	5 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 15	7 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 14	2 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 2	68 280	4.118	4 <sup>th</sup>
Underdevelopment and Unemployment	45 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 225	18 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 72	1 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 3	4 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 8	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	68 308	4.529	1 <sup>st</sup>
Environmental Damage due to Oil Spillage	10 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 50	25 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 100	7 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 21	13 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 26	13 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 13	68 210	3.088	7 <sup>th</sup>
Human Rights Violation	29 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 145	24 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 96	2 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 6	11 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 22	2 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 2	68 271	3.985	5 <sup>th</sup>
Bad Governance/Corruption	38 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 190	17 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 68	4 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 12	9 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 18	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	68 288	4.235	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Religious Matters	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	43 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 129	1 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 2	24 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 24	68 155	2.279	8 <sup>th</sup>
Racism	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	13 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 39	2 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 4	53 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 53	68 96	1.412	9 <sup>th</sup>
Ethno Social Crisis	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	0 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 0	4 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 12	7 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 14	57 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 57	68 83	1.221	10 <sup>th</sup>
Struggle for Political Power	31 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 155	20 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 80	2 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 6	9 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 18	6 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 6	68 265	3.897	6 <sup>th</sup>
Agitation For Resource control	52 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 260	5 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 20	7 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 21	1 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 2	3 a;n <sub>i</sub> = 3	68 306	4.5	2 <sup>nd</sup>

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 9 shows the respondents' ranking of the causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt city. The table reveals that underdevelopment and unemployment was ranked as number one with an RII of 4.529, agitation for resource control with an RII of 4.5 was ranked as number two cause. Other causes ranked in order of effect are bad governance/corruption (RII=4.235), hostility in the Niger Delta (RII=4.118), human rights violation (RII=3.985), struggle for political power (RII=3.897), environmental damage due to oil spillage (RII=3.088), religious matters (RII=2.279), racism (RII=1.412) and ethno social crisis (RII=1.221). Comparing tables 8 and 9 it is obvious that underdevelopment and unemployment, agitation for resource control, bad governance/corruption, hostility in the Niger Delta, human rights violation, struggle for political power are the main causes of militant activities in the study area.

**Table 10: Communalities**

Components	Initial	Extraction
Hostility in the Niger delta	1.000	.765
Underdevelopment and unemployment	1.000	.812
Environmental damage due to oil spillage	1.000	.627
Human rights violation	1.000	.665
Bad governance/corruption	1.000	.672
Religious matters	1.000	.748
Racism	1.000	.827
Ethno social crisis	1.000	.720
Struggle for political power	1.000	.361
Agitation for resource control	1.000	.584

Source: Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 10 shows the amount of variance in each variable. Initial communalities are estimates of the variance in each variable accounted for by all components or factors. Extraction communalities are estimates of the variance which each variable accounts for. The communalities in Table 10 are high, indicating that the extracted components represent the variable well.

**Table 11: Total Variance Explained**

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% Of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.340	23.404	23.404	2.340	23.404	23.404
2	2.054	20.540	43.944	2.054	20.540	43.944
3	1.325	13.252	57.196	1.325	13.252	57.196
4	1.062	10.615	67.811	1.062	10.615	67.811
5	.968	9.677	77.488			
6	.664	6.638	84.126			
7	.530	5.300	89.426			
8	.457	4.573	93.999			
9	.408	4.075	98.074			
10	.193	1.926	100.000			

**Source:** Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 11 shows the variance explained by the initial eigenvalues (Initial solution). Under the Initial Eigenvalues the total column gives the amount of variance in the original variables accounted for by each component, the percent of variance column gives the ratio of the variance accounted for by each component of the total variance in all of the variables. The eigenvalues greater than one was extracted and this show that the first four principal components (hostility in the Niger Delta, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental damage due to oil spillage and human rights violation) form the extracted solution accounting for 67.8% of the total variability in all the 10 factors so that the complexity of all the factors can be reduced using the extracted variables

**Table 12: Component Matrix**

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Hostility in the Niger delta	.091	-.135	.859	-.027
Underdevelopment and unemployment	-.039	-.349	.055	.828
Environmental damage due to oil spillage	.002	.683	.213	.340
Human rights violation	-.463	.592	-.123	.293
Bad governance/corruption	-.538	.268	.555	-.045
Religious matters	.832	.135	.097	.166
Racism	.845	.265	.013	.205
Ethno social crisis	.485	.638	-.129	-.248
Struggle for political power	.003	.491	.302	-.172
Agitation for resource control	-.430	.538	-.313	.106

**Source:** Author's Fieldwork, 2013.

Table 12 shows the rotated component matrix of the four components that accounted for 67.8% of the total variability in the original 10 variables. The first component (hostility in the Niger Delta) is most highly correlated with racism (0.845) meaning that the hostility in the Niger Delta is responsible for racism in Port Harcourt, however it is less correlated with bad governance and corruption (-0.538). The second component (underdevelopment and unemployment) is most highly correlated with environmental damage due to oil spillage (0.683). The third component (environmental damage due to oil spillage) is most highly correlated with hostility in the Niger Delta (0.859) showing that it best explains the hostility in the Niger Delta and the fourth component (human rights violation) is most highly correlated with underdevelopment and unemployment (0.828). This further confirms that the first four factors earlier identified are the major causes of militant activities the study area.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examined the causes of militant activities and their effects on property values in Port Harcourt. It was discovered that militant activities within the study area affected the marketability of properties in the areas; this was evident in the difficulties which Estate Surveyors and Valuers faced in getting properties in areas affected by the activities disposed off by sale and/or letting. Also a fall in rental values of properties was discovered from the period when the activities started and an increase after the violent activities stopped. This goes to show that the militant activities in Port Harcourt affected property value.

The study also showed that there is a variance in rental values over the period of time studied between the areas affected by militant activities and the areas not affected by militant activities, with the areas not affected having higher rental values than the areas exposed to militant activities. The analysis carried out shows that the major causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt, Rivers State are underdevelopment and unemployment. The study therefore recommends that concerted efforts are required on the part of both the government and oil companies in mitigating the various factors leading to militant activities in Port Harcourt. Doing this, will attract interest of residents to the city thereby resulting into increased demand for properties and attendant increase in rental values.

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