

Men of the North Wind the Norman Knight in the 11th Century Mediterranean

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The Battle of Hastings in 1066, perhaps one of the most famous events in the English speaking world, has long been used to mark the point at which the old order of the Anglo-Saxons was swept away by the Normans and their knights. The knight was now the unchallenged master of the battlefield. However, the military system employed by the Anglo-Saxons was only one of the possible challengers to the knight's supremacy. Rather than the conquest of their English kingdom, it was the conquests in the Mediterranean, where the Normans also established a kingdom, which best demonstrate both how and why the knight came to dominate the medieval battlefield. At its height, this other Norman kingdom included Southern Italy, Sicily, Malta, and part of Tunisia. Here in the Mediterranean, the Normans faced the armies of the Byzantine Empire, the Italian Lombards, and the Muslims of Sicily and North Africa, all of whom possessed a seemingly more advanced culture and a long military heritage. In almost every battle the paltry Norman forces were significantly outnumbered by the opposing armies. That the Normans still managed to emerge victorious was in no small part due to the battlefield dominance of the knight.

The historiography of the Norman conquests in the Mediterranean while not nearly as extensive as that of their English conquests possesses an equally impressive pedigree, though one with humble beginnings. The Mediterranean conquests briefly feature in Edward Gibbon's (1737-1794) *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, although the Normans themselves are presented as nothing more than another group of barbarians at the gates of the empire.¹ Hans Delbruck (1848-1929) devoted just four pages of his monumental *History of the Art of War*, to the Normans in Italy; perhaps because this Norman kingdom failed to develop into a modern nation state.² While Sir Charles Oman (1860-1946) displayed some interest in the Mediterranean conquests, he was only concerned with its relation to the battle of Hastings and what he discern about the mechanics of the Saxon shield wall and the Norman knight.³

It was not until 1967 that John Julius Norwich presented a truly comprehensive treatment of the Normans in the Mediterranean. His work *The Normans in the South 1016-1130*, was the first of what would become a two volume account of the Norman kingdoms in the Mediterranean. It should be noted however, that the author's fondness for hyperbole and emphasis on racial characteristics limits its overall value.⁴ In the 1980's Graham A. Loud became the next historian to make a major contribution to the historiography of the Normans in the Mediterranean. Loud has contributed so much that it is difficult to overemphasize his historiographical importance. Some of his principle works include *Church and Society in the Norman Principality of Capua 1058-1197*; *Conquerors and Churchmen in Norman Italy*; *The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest*; and *The Society of Norman Italy*. Loud also deserves credit for his work with the source material, as he has produced nearly all of the most modern translations. Many other historians have made contributions which also deserve some acknowledgement, such as that of John France, and Gordon S. Brown who addressed the arrival of the Normans in Southern Italy and their conquests.⁵ Alexios G. C. Savvides and Georgios Theotokis have focused their efforts on the Norman campaigns against the Byzantines.

¹ Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. (New York: Modern Library, 2005), Ch. 56

² Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War, Vol. III Medieval Warfare*. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 183-186.

³ Charles W. C. Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1953), 26-30.

⁴ John Julius Norwich. *The Normans in the South 1016-1130*. (London: Solitaire Books, 1981), xii.

⁵ France, John. "The occasion of the coming of the Normans to southern Italy". In *Journal of Medieval History* (Vol. 17 IS. 3, 1991) & Gordon S. Brown, *The Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily*. (London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2003.)

It should be noted however, that these campaigns extended beyond the chronological scope of this work.⁶ Charles D. Stanton's "The Use of Naval Power in the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily," demonstrated how the Normans, for all their famed prowess as mounted warriors and castle builders, forged and wielded a formidable naval presence which enabled them, for a time, to dominate the central Mediterranean, militarily and commercially.⁷ Stanton has since significantly expanded this thesis in his 2011 *Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean*.⁸ Most recently Paul Hill's 2014, *The Norman Commanders: Masters of Warfare 911-1135*, explored the men who commanded the various Norman armies and their achievements.⁹

Norman operations in the Mediterranean inspired a large volume of contemporary accounts, though not nearly as many as the conquest of England, much of which has survived to the present. This body of documents takes the form of chronicles, letters, apologetic treatises by the Popes Leo IX and Gregory VII, narrative histories and epic poems.¹⁰ Despite Norman involvement with the Muslims of Sicily, very little source material from the Muslim perspective has survived, and that which has is fragmentary and confused, which is why no Muslim sources were considered.¹¹ The primary sources selected for this discussion are William of Apulia's *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard*; Geoffrey Malaterra's *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard*; and Anna Comnena's *The Alexiad*. These sources are the most accessible, most comprehensive, and were composed closest to the events they describe. The individual sources will be discussed in greater detail later on, as they are encountered.

In order to discern how the Normans' knightly military system fared was able to so completely dominate the military systems encountered during the conquest of their Mediterranean kingdom, three key battles were selected for analysis. These battles were chosen because they are among the best represented in the source material, fit within the initial period of the conquest, and best reflect the military systems faced by the Norman knights. All three of the selected battles were fought in the field; sieges and naval battles will not be examined. Sieges, an important component of feudal warfare, were not included because these signify a perceived inequity between the opposing forces, an acknowledgement by the besieged of the besiegers' superior military might. Naval battles were not considered because they involved factors besides such as tides, currents, wind and weather. There was no "knightly" aspect of naval warfare during this period and most of the ships were crewed by Lombards, Greeks, and Muslims rather than Normans.¹² Furthermore, in the event of either a siege or naval engagement, the knights would not be able to bring the full weight of their capabilities to bear on the enemy, as cavalry cannot storm a fortress or fight on the deck of a ship. As we shall see, horses were fundamental to both the knight's battlefield dominance and the very conception of knighthood.

The knightly military system of the eleventh century was made possible by the development of what is now referred to as feudalism or the feudal system. Prior to the advent of the feudal system western European armies consisted predominately of infantry. The majority of these infantrymen were local militia or levies, while the rest were the elite household troops belonging to the local chieftain.¹³ On occasion these troops would fight as mounted infantry, riding to the battlefield before dismounting.

⁶ Alexios G.C. Savvides. *Byzantino-Normannica: The Norman Capture of Italy (to A.D. 1081) and the First Two Invasions in Byzantium (A.D. 1081-1085 and 1107-1108)*. (Dudley, MA: Peeters Publishers & Department of Oriental Studies Bondgenotenlaan, 2007.) & Georgios Theotokis. *Norman Campaigns in the Balkans, 1081-1108*. Woodbridge UK: The Boydell Press, 2014.

⁷ Charles D. Stanton, "The Use of Naval Power in the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily." In *Haskins Society Journal*. (Vol. 19, Pages 120-136, 2008), 120-121.

⁸ Charles D. Stanton, *Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean*. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2011.

⁹ Paul Hill. *The Norman Commanders: Masters of Warfare 911-1135*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2015.

¹⁰ Kenneth Baxter Wolf. *Making History: The Normans and their Historians in Eleventh-Century Italy*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995.), 6.

¹¹ Alex Metcalfe. *The Muslims of medieval Italy*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.), 89.

¹² Matthew Bennett. "Rulers of the Waves: Norman naval activity in the Mediterranean". In *Medieval Warfare*. (Vol. I Issue 4 pages 21- 24. Zutphen: Karwansaray Publishers, 2012.), 24.

¹³ Guy Halsall. *Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900*. (New York: Routledge, 2003.), 116-117.

Cavalry was rare, as horses were expensive and mainly used for raids and harassing enemy formations.¹⁴ Although it was to express itself in a myriad of different forms, the feudal system was originally and primarily intended to extract the wealth necessary to support the knightly military system. Under the feudal system, land, the primary form of wealth, was divided into units or fiefs which could generate the wealth necessary to raise, equip and support a heavily-armed and-armored cavalryman, or knight.¹⁵ The lords who controlled the land granted the knights their fiefs. Upon receiving his fief, a knight would then owe military service to a lord, since it was the lord who provided them with the land which enabled them to be a knight, and thus enjoy all the privileges that status entailed.

The wealth extracted by the feudal system was necessary because the knight was at the cutting edge of eleventh century military technology. Each knight required at least one trained warhorse, which was specially bred for size and strength, as the horse was required to support the weight of a fully equipped knight on its back.¹⁶ Since the impact caused by striking an enemy or being struck by an enemy could leave a knight unhorsed, a knight's saddle had a special high back to help keep him on his mount.¹⁷ The saddle also had stirrups, a technological innovation which allowed for greater balance, control, and enabled the knight to strike with more force.¹⁸ While a knight might also carry a sword, mace, or axe, his primary offensive weapon was the lance. During the eleventh century knight's employed their lances from three different positions: the underarm swing, the over arm stab downwards, and the couched lance.¹⁹ Of the three positions, it was the couched lance that was the most recent innovation, and the one which would eventually render the others obsolete. A couched lance was grasped with one hand, and held horizontally, with the blunt end tucked under the armpit. By couching his lance, the knight had more control as he galloped towards his enemy and was able to strike with far more force.²⁰ This technique made it almost impossible for any foe to survive a strike from the lance of a charging knight. The Knight's defensive equipment in this period consisted of a heavy mail coat, helmet, and a recently developed shield, that was shaped like a kite in order to protect the unarmored left leg which was dangerously exposed while the knight was mounted.²¹

In battle, knights usually deployed in either a line or wedge formation.²² The line formation was often several ranks deep and so tight that each knight's knees touched those of his neighbor. Advancing slowly, gradually building speed until they crashed straight into their enemies, the knights would then launch a series of frontal assaults.²³ If confronted by an enemy that appeared more disciplined or held their ground, the knights might form into one or more wedges, a tightly packed triangular formation. Although this formation meant that the knights struck their enemy on a narrower front, they also struck with more violence and penetrated deeper into the enemy formation. Should an enemy not be defeated by repeated charges, or if they were losing, the knights might feign a retreat.²⁴ The enemy, led to believe they were winning or had won, were thus tempted into breaking their formation to pursue the retreating knights. After a set distance, the knights would stop, reform, and turn on their pursuers who now, out of formation, were cut down.

The knights were the elite of the Norman army, but infantry played an important auxiliary role, though there were often doubts about the infantry's reliability, which was reflected in how they were deployed as on one occasion when: "The foot-soldiers were advised to station themselves on the left and right flanks; a few horsemen [*requesters*] were posted with them to provide a reinforcement to stiffen the footmen. They were absolutely forbidden to leave the field. If they were forced to retire by the enemy they were to regroup.

¹⁴ David Nicolle. *European Medieval Tactics (1): The Fall and Rise of Cavalry 450-1260*. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2011.), 27-28.

¹⁵ Christopher Gravett; David Nicolle, *The Normans: Warrior Knights and their Castles*. (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006), 20.

¹⁶ Robert Jones. *Knight: The Warrior and the World of Chivalry*. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011.), 61.

¹⁷ William Stroock. "How to fight and win like a Norman: Strategy and tactics of the Normans". In *Medieval Warfare*. (Vol. I Issue 4 pages 13-15. Zutphen: Karwansaray Publishers, 2012.), 14.

¹⁸ Jones, 24.

¹⁹ Nicolle, 30-31.

²⁰ Nicolle, 28.

²¹ Gravett; Nicolle, 79.

²² Stroock, 13.

²³ Gravett; Nicolle, 99.

²⁴ Gravett; Nicolle, 100-101.

After these troops were instructed and placed on each flank, a column of cavalry [*equestris*] advanced a little way forward.”²⁵ Infantry formations were used to provide a refuge, where, if the enemy was not overcome by the first charge, the knights could rest, regroup, reform, and launch further charges.²⁶ The infantry could also make their own attacks to exploit any local opportunities or successful attacks made by the knights. Archers, if present, were primarily responsible for softening up the enemy soldiers before the knights launched their charge. After the conquest of Sicily, the Normans often employed large numbers of Muslim archers, whose ferocity and skill intimidated their Christian opponents.²⁷ The Normans were also masters of terror tactics, which they employed to sap an enemy’s will to fight before they ever reached the battlefield.²⁸ On one occasion, “Robert [the Norman Commander] ordered them to burn, pillage and ravage all those lands which he had invaded, and do all they could to instill terror in the inhabitants.”²⁹ In some cases, the Normans succeeded in burning and plundering an entire region into submission.

The first battle selected for analysis is the Battle of Civitate (1053), which was described in William of Apulia’s *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard*. William of Apulia was possibly a layman, as he included relatively few religious motifs in his work, and possibly of Lombard-Norman origins.³⁰ William appears to have been well-educated as he writes in good classical Latin, and was familiar with Homer, Virgil, and Lucan. He was also a member of the court of Roger Borsa, the Norman Duke of Apulia and son of Robert Guiscard.³¹ As such, he would have had access to eyewitness accounts of some of the events he described. His history, *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard*, was composed sometime around 1096-1099, possibly at the behest of Roger Borsa, and covers roughly the period of 1016-1085. It was modeled on the ancient epic tradition, and was intended to provide the Normans with an epic past, in order to justify the contemporary actions of the Normans and their conquests in Southern Italy.³²

The Battle of Civitate (1053) was fought against the Italian Lombards, whose military heritage in the eleventh century stretched back nearly four hundred years. While Lombard armies did exhibit some Byzantine and Islamic influences, they drew most heavily on the military traditions of their Germanic past.³³ Infantry was the core of the Lombard army, although these were mainly militiamen called out by their prince for a single campaign.³⁴ Lightly armed and not well trained, their main duty was to defend towns and cities from behind walls or fortifications. Typically more numerous than the Lombard cavalymen, they acted as a holding force while the cavalry maneuvered. Lombard cavalymen were not as heavily armed or armored as the Norman knights; their preferred weapon was a short spear or javelin.³⁵ Rather than making head-on assaults against enemy formations, they would harass and weaken the enemy missile weapons and shock attacks on the flanks and rear. Once the enemy was put to flight, the Lombard cavalry would carry out a vigorous pursuit.

The Battle of Civitate resulted from the tensions which followed the arrival of the Normans in Italy. Ever since the Normans began settling in southern Italy around 1030, they sought to establish fiefs and vassalage in an area where feudalism was previously unknown.³⁶ The Normans seized control of the regions of Apulia, Calabria, and Campania, while subjecting the local population to the cavalcade, an often brutal raid which was used to assert dominance over a region.

²⁵ William of Apulia. *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard*. (Translated by G.A. Loud. <http://medievalsicily.com>. Accessed 03/18/2012.), Book I, 9. Although *equestres* and *equestris* have been translated as “horsemen” and “cavalry,” they should be understood as “knights” since the cavalry of the Norman army consisted entirely of Normans who were equipped and fought as knights.

²⁶ Gravett; Nicolle, 100.

²⁷ Gravett; Nicolle, 57.

²⁸ Stroock, 14-15.

²⁹ William of Apulia, Book II, 23.

³⁰ Wolf, 125-126.

³¹ Wolf, 124.

³² Wolf, 128-129.

³³ Barbara Kreutz. *Before the Normans: Southern Italy in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.), 148-149.

³⁴ Ibid, 33.

³⁵ Brown. 70-71.

³⁶ Brown, 52.

It was soon reported that “all Apulia trembled before the Gauls [Normans], whose cruelty caused the deaths of many.”³⁷ Most significantly, however, the Normans were accused of attacking churches and monasteries in Campania, a region the Pope claimed as part of his domain.³⁸ Therefore, by 1052 the new Pope, Leo IX, was determined to put an end to Norman aggression in the region. Leo IX feared that a strong Norman state to the south threatened Papal independence, since he already had a strong neighbor to the north, the German Empire, which though a nominal ally believed it had the right to directly intervene in Papal affairs.³⁹

To meet the threat, Leo IX created an anti-Norman coalition, which included both the Italian Lombard princes and the Byzantine Empire. Although Leo requested aid from the German Empire, the emperor was faced with other more pressing domestic issues and could only send 700 Swabian mercenaries.⁴⁰ With the addition of these troops to those of the Lombard princes, Leo raised an army estimated at around 6,000 infantry and cavalry. For their part, the Byzantines sent out agents, who started anti-Norman rebellions amongst the peasants, which denied the Normans access to any source of supplies.⁴¹ William of Apulia related how, “...rebel castra everywhere helped the Germans [Leo IX] and gave them [the Normans] no provisions or material help.”⁴² In response, the Normans moved to intercept Leo IX’s army which was attempting to join with a smaller Byzantine force. All told, the Normans were only able to gather around 3,000 knights and 500 infantry because of the revolt.⁴³ Then, “After three days without bread, they [the Normans] resorted to arms, all preferring to die honorably in battle rather than that so many of them should perish miserably through hunger...” thus, the Normans were forced to face Leo IX’s army at Civitate.⁴⁴

The Normans deployed their army in three divisions of 1,000 knights each, under the command of Richard of Aversa on the right, Humphrey D’Hauteville at the center and Robert Guiscard on the left.⁴⁵ The 500 infantry were deployed behind Robert Guiscard’s knights. Leo IX’s army deployed with the 700 Swabians dismounted at the center, opposite Humphrey D’Hauteville’s contingent. To the left of the Swabians, the Lombard contingent was in a large mass of infantry and cavalry, opposite Richard of Aversa.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the rest of the coalition’s forces remained to the rear of the Swabians in a disorganized mass.

The Normans swiftly launched an all-out frontal attack with their knights, which seem to have taken the Papal Coalition by surprise. Richard of Aversa’s division quickly swept the disorganized Lombard contingent from the field.⁴⁷ The Swabians formed into a square and were able to repel Humphrey D’Hauteville’s men. Then the divisional by Robert Guiscard attacked the Swabian’s unprotected right flank, which panicked the coalition troops to the Swabians’ rear causing a further rout. Despite coming under attack from two sides and watching their allies flee, the Swabians fought on resolutely. However, Richard of Aversa returned from his pursuit of the Lombard contingent and attacked the Swabian rear.⁴⁸ The Swabian mercenaries refused to surrender, and fought to the death, but in the end “The unhappy men perished in various ways, and of all these men not one survived.”⁴⁹

In the aftermath of the battle, Leo IX was turned over, by the citizens of Civitate, to the Normans, who treated him with the upmost respect, but imprisoned him nonetheless.⁵⁰ After a confinement of nine months, Leo IX officially recognized the Norman conquests and was released, only to die one month later in 1054. Diplomatic relations between Rome and Constantinople broke down, over a perceived lack of Byzantine support, and the papal legates and Orthodox clergy excommunicated each other.

³⁷William of Apulia, Book I, 3.

³⁸Brown, 67.

³⁹Filippo Donvito. “The Norman challenge to the Pope: The Battle of Civitate, June 18, 1053”. (In *Medieval Warfare*. Vol. I Issue 4 pages 27- 34. Zutphen: Karwansaray Publishers, 2012.), 28.

⁴⁰Ibid, 38.

⁴¹Donvito, 29.

⁴² William of Apulia, Book II, 19. The Normans had only recently introduced the Feudal System to Southern Italy, so *castra* should be understood as strongholds rather than the motte-and bailey castles of Northern France.

⁴³Donvito, 28-29.

⁴⁴Ibid, 42.

⁴⁵Ibid, 39.

⁴⁶Ibid, 39.

⁴⁷ Norwich, 92.

⁴⁸Donvito, 32.

⁴⁹ William of Apulia, Book II, 22.

⁵⁰Brown, 7.

Then, in 1058, Pope Nicholas II called the Normans for support against his rival Benedict X and the Roman aristocracy.⁵¹ In return for the Norman intervention, Nicholas II crowned Richard of Aversa, Prince of Capua, and Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia. Surprisingly, the Battle of Civitate led to a close alliance between the Normans and the Church. Command and control was especially vital to the outcome of the battle of Civitate. Either no one in the coalition forces knew how to form an army for battle, or there was no clearly delineated chain of command, as evidenced by the sloppy deployment.⁵² Richard of Aversa, the Norman leader, maintained control of his forces and was thus able to call back his men from their pursuit of the Lombards to attack the Swabian rear.⁵³ That he was able to do so was a testament to the discipline and training of the knights. Although the Swabian mercenaries were described as knights in the sources, they chose to fight dismounted. William of Apulia observed of the Swabians that “These were proud people of great courage, but not versed in horsemanship, which would rather fight with the sword than the lance.”⁵⁴ Their preference of the old Germanic style of combat on foot helped them to resist the attacks made by the Norman knights, but meant that when the battle was lost, they could not escape and were thus all slain.⁵⁵ The knightly military system of the Normans had a clear advantage over the Italian Lombard’s Germanic system in terms of discipline and mobility.

The next battle selected for analysis is the Battle of Cerami (1063), which is found in Geoffrey Malaterra’s *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard*. Geoffrey Malaterra, probably a Norman by birth, was enlisted by Count Roger to help establish the Latin Church in Sicily.⁵⁶ A well-educated monk, he knew Virgil, Lucan, and Sallust. His work, *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard* was written at almost the exact same time as *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard*, between 1096 and 1099, but seemingly without knowledge of the other.⁵⁷ It was written at the request of the elder Count Roger, uncle of Roger Borsa and brother of Robert Guiscard, and covers roughly 1000-1098. The purpose of Geoffrey’s history, written in both verse and prose, was to immortalize Count Roger and his conquest of Sicily, while entertaining the count and his friends.⁵⁸

The Battle of Cerami (1063) was fought against the Muslims of Sicily and their North African allies. Generally, the military system of the Sicilian and North African Muslims was very similar to that of the period of the Arab conquests.⁵⁹ Muslim cavalymen in Sicily and North Africa had a long heritage of mounted warfare but were lightly armed, favoring short spears, javelins, and swords.⁶⁰ They commonly wore little defensive armor, and relied on the superior quality of their horses, in terms of speed and maneuverability, to keep them from harm. In battle, they launched continuous harassing attacks on the enemy rarely committing to close combat, before lining up the eventual knockout blow. Some cavalymen fought as mounted archers, though in Sicily, their numbers were few because of the terrain and lack of Turkish influence.⁶¹ However, Sicilian Muslim armies contained a great number of archers, who fought on foot but utilized the new Turkish style composite bows, which provided greater range and power.⁶² The lightly armored infantrymen were deployed in deep, solid formations that provided a refuge for the cavalry if the enemy succeeded in driving it back. Otherwise, the infantry remained on the defensive and let the enemy wear themselves out by attacking its impenetrable ranks, while the archers further weakened the enemy. When the enemy was exhausted the infantry launched an all out counterattack.⁶³

The Battle of Cerami resulted from a long period of instability and civil war which gripped Sicily for several decades.⁶⁴

⁵¹ Donvito, 34.

⁵² Donvito, 33.

⁵³ Ibid, 48.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 49.

⁵⁵ Brown, 72-73.

⁵⁶ Wolf, 143-144.

⁵⁷ Wolf, 6.

⁵⁸ Wolf, 145-146.

⁵⁹ Brian Todd Carey; Joshua B. Alltree; John Cairns. *Warfare in the Medieval World*. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2012.),41-42.

⁶⁰ Gravett; Nicolle, 58.

⁶¹ Gravett; Nicolle, 56-57.

⁶² Gravett; Nicolle, 57.

⁶³ Carey; Alltree; Cairns, 42-43.

⁶⁴ Metcalfe, 70.

Possession of Sicily shifted from the Fatimids of Egypt to the Zirids of North Africa, whose attempted tax reform created a financial crisis which caused the rural population to revolt. At the same time, the Byzantines launched two invasions which were defeated by the Zirid army, but further destabilized the island.⁶⁵ In this already volatile situation, two warlords, Ibn al-Thumna and Ibn al-Hawwas, rose to power and vied for control of Sicily. Ibn al-Thumna was defeated at the battle of Castrogiovanna, and in 1061 fled to the mainland to recruit a mercenary army.⁶⁶ Robert Guiscard and his brother Roger decided to intervene, and crossing over from Italy they captured Messina. By the end of 1062, Robert Guiscard turned the Sicilian campaign over to Roger and returned to the mainland.

In response to the Norman invasion, the Zirid Sultan Temim dispatched two armies to Sicily under his sons Ayub and Ali.⁶⁷ They landed at Palermo and Agrigento and gathered local reinforcements before joining their armies. While the actual size of the army is unknown, most sources put it at around 30,000; or as Geoffrey Malaterra simply stated “the Africans and the Arabs, in conjunction with the Sicilians had raised a great army and were coming to wage war on the count.”⁶⁸ Roger had 100 knights and around 500 infantry under his direct command, and another thirty knights under his nephew Serlo.⁶⁹ The two armies observed and probed each other for three days before the Zirid army moved against the small but strategic town of Cerami. Serlo was dispatched to garrison the town with his knights, while Roger brought up the rest of the army. Soon after his arrival, the Zirids launched an assault on Cerami, which was met with a counterattack led by Serlo, “bursting through the gates like raging lion and inflicting great casualties on them [Zirids].”⁷⁰ Roger arrived a short time later to find that Serlo had beaten off the assault and held Cerami.⁷¹

In response to their repulse, Ali and Ayub regrouped their army, “Organizing themselves into two battle lines, they boldly rushed forward to meet our men [the Normans].”⁷² Ignoring Serlo forces in Cerami on their left, they focused their attack where Roger was commanding in an attempt to kill Roger and rout his army. Roger, with little time, prepared to receive the Zirid assault and, “The Count likewise formed two battle lines in the form of wedges [*cuneos*].”⁷³ Roger’s line barely held back the assault, as his “men were more scared than usual because of the truly terrifying numbers of the enemy.”⁷⁴ Serlo then led his men out of Cerami and attacked the flank of the Zirid army. Though the battle continued the rest of the day, devolving into a giant melee, there was no further maneuvering. Roger’s men “were so hampered by the huge enemy force with whom they were intermingled that scarcely any of them could break out of the melee.”⁷⁵ As evening fell, the Zirid army broke and fled, possibly precipitated by the deaths of Ali and Ayub, whose fates are unreported. The Normans pursued the Zirids, and slew many of them before reaching the Zirid army’s camp, which they stopped to capture and plunder.⁷⁶

The Norman victory at Cerami was vital to the conquest of Sicily, as it secured Norman control of the whole region between Troina and Messina.⁷⁷ Control of this region ensured that the Normans had a secure base of operations from which they could launch further campaigns. With a few exceptions, no Muslim army in Sicily sought to face the Normans in the field until 1068.⁷⁸ The rest of the island was conquered through a series of sieges, aimed at the major cities such as Syracuse and Palermo.

⁶⁵ Metcalfe, 82-83.

⁶⁶ Metcalfe, 85.

⁶⁷ Brown, 117.

⁶⁸ Geoffrey Malaterra. *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard*. (Translated by Kenneth Baxter Wolf. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008.), Book II, Ch. 33, 107.

⁶⁹ Norwich, 157.

⁷⁰ Geoffrey Malaterra. *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria & Sicily & of his Brother Duke Robert Guiscard*. (Translated by G.A. Loud. <http://medievalsicily.com>. Accessed 03/18/2014.), Book II, Ch. 33, 31.

⁷¹ Brown, 118.

⁷² Geoffrey Malaterra, Translated by Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Book II, Ch. 33, 109.

⁷³ Ibid, 72. Here *cuneos* has been rightly translated as “wedges” since a column would have been quickly surrounded and destroyed, as the flanks of a column are particularly vulnerable to attack.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 70.

⁷⁵ Geoffrey Malaterra, Translated by G.A. Loud, Book II, Ch. 33, 32.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 71.

⁷⁷ Norwich, 158-159.

⁷⁸ Norwich, 165-166.

Later, the Battle of Cerami acquired even greater significance; witnesses reported that during the battle, the emblem of St. George was seen at the tip of Roger's lance.⁷⁹ Others reported that the saint himself had even joined in the battle on the side of the Normans claiming that; "there appeared a certain knight, magnificent in his armor, mounted on a white horse and carrying a white standard with a splendid cross on it tied to the tip of his lance."⁸⁰ In recognition of this divine aid, Roger sent some of the spoils from the victory to Pope Alexander II. In return Alexander II sent Roger a Papal banner to fly in battle, and proclaimed that all those who assisted in delivering Sicily from Muslim domination would receive an absolution of sin.⁸¹

In this instance, morale was the key factor which contributed to the Norman victory at Cerami. The Normans believed that with their abilities they could win and that they could rely the divine intervention of God, who sent St. George to actively aid in the battle.⁸² Despite a momentary lapse, the morale of the knights remained high; while their continued resistance eroded the morale of the Zirid army, which collapsed following the deaths of their leaders. Confidence in victory is critical in battle, especially when so outnumbered. Technology was another key factor in the Norman victory at Cerami; the knights 'possessed heavier armor and larger shields than their opponents.'⁸³ The extra protection increased their chances of survival and allowed them to stay in the fight longer; the extra weight also increased the momentum of their cavalry charges, multiplying the damage inflicted.⁸⁴ This meant that although they were outnumbered, "the enemy saw that our men were scattering the dense formations of pagans [Muslims] and Sicilians."⁸⁵ The Normans' armor allowed them to ride through the Zirids large formations almost at will, while they themselves remained unharmed, further sapping the Zirid's morale. Eventually this moral and technological discrepancy told and "Exhausted by the long battle, they [the Zirids] were unable to withstand our men's [the Normans] attack any longer and strove to flee rather than fight."⁸⁶

The final battle selected for analysis, the Battle of Dyrrachium (1081), was described by Anna Comnena in *the Alexiad*. Anna Comnena was born in 1083; as the eldest child of the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I, she received the best education the empire could provide.⁸⁷ At age eight she was betrothed to Constantine Ducas, who was the rightful heir to the throne, which he was to inherit after Alexius. Later, when her engagement was broken off and her brother John named heir, Anna was briefly exiled to a convent after attempting to have him assassinated.⁸⁸ Anna's history, *The Alexiad*, was written in 1137 after the death of her husband Nikephoros Bryennios, an extremely cultured historian whom she married in 1097, and utilizing his compilation of source material.⁸⁹ It covers roughly 1070 -1118 and was intended to glorify the reign of her father, Alexius I, and magnify his achievements. Anna also intended it to denigrate Alexius' successors, including her brother John, by comparison, as well as promoting the righteousness and superiority of the Byzantine Empire.⁹⁰

The Battle of Dyrrachium (1081) was fought against the Byzantine Empire, and perhaps the most dangerous enemy the Normans ever encountered. The empire had a centuries-long military tradition to draw upon, though at this time the army itself was in disrepair.⁹¹ Losses incurred at the Battle of Manzikert (1071) and in the civil wars which followed meant that most of the army now consisted of mercenaries, though there were still some native elements. Cumans, Pechenegs, and Turks were recruited in large numbers to serve as horse archers; while Normans, Germans, and Franks supplied the heavy cavalry, though they did not attack at the same high speed as did the Norman Knights.⁹²

⁷⁹Brown, 118-119.

⁸⁰ Geoffrey Malaterra, Translated by Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Book II, Ch. 33,109-110.

⁸¹Norwich, 159.

⁸²Ibid, 79.

⁸³Gravett; Nicolle, 58-59.

⁸⁴Ibid, 20.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 75.

⁸⁶Ibid, 75.

⁸⁷Graham A. Loud. "Anna Komnena and her sources for the Normans of southern Italy", *Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages. Essays Presented to John Taylor*, (ed. I.N. Wood & G.A. Loud (London 1991), pp 41-57), 41.

⁸⁸ Anna Comnena. *The Alexiad*. Translated by E. R. A. Sewter, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.), 13.

⁸⁹ Anna Comnena. *The Alexiad*. Translated by E. R. A. Sewter, 14.

⁹⁰Loud. "Anna Komnena and her sources for the Normans of southern Italy", 43-44.

⁹¹ Brian Todd Carey; Joshua B. Alltree; John Cairns. *Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071*. (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2012.), 120-121.

⁹²John Haldon. *The Byzantine Wars*. (Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2011.), 166-167.

Instead, they attacked in the Byzantine fashion; where they went forward at a slow steady advance intended to roll over the enemy. In battle, the horse archers would weaken the enemy formation before the heavy cavalry delivered the knockout blow. Likewise, most of the Byzantine infantrymen were recruited from outside the empire. Bulgarians and Georgians were prized as light infantrymen and archers, and were recruited in large numbers.⁹³ The rest of the infantry was recruited from a variety of sources and fought primarily as spearmen. However, the best troops possessed by the empire were the fabled Varangian Guard, which at this time consisted of mostly Anglo-Saxon exiles and refugees displaced by the Norman conquest of England.⁹⁴ Heavily armed and armored, these mounted infantrymen were fiercely loyal to the emperor and served as his personal guard. Although it was rather heterogeneous, the Byzantine army was extremely tough, well disciplined, and highly flexible.

In 1071, Robert Guiscard captured the city of Bari, the last Byzantine stronghold in Italy, while the Byzantine preoccupation with the Seljuk Turks kept their forces in Anatolia preventing retaliation.⁹⁵ Following the defeat at Manzikert (1071), the rest of the empire was soon gripped by civil war and instability. By 1073, Michael VII, the new Byzantine emperor, offered to marry his son Constantine Ducas to Robert Guiscard's daughter Helena, in hopes of securing a powerful ally and forestalling further Norman aggression.⁹⁶ Constantine was the heir to the imperial throne, so Robert Guiscard, hoping to expand his influence and power, accepted the proposal and sent Helena to Constantinople. However, in 1078, Michael VII was overthrown when two of his generals Nikephoros Botaneiates and Nikephoros Bryennios, the father or grandfather of Anna's husband, revolted.⁹⁷ Nikephoros Botaneiates, the elder and more influential of the two, became emperor and had Nikephoros Bryennios blinded. Michael VII's fall from power destroyed any chances Helena had of ascending the throne.⁹⁸ Robert Guiscard, claiming that Helena had been mistreated, declared war on the empire, but his invasion was delayed by a revolt in Italy. In the meantime, Alexius Comnenus, a skilled Byzantine general, led a successful coup and crowned him and Constantine Ducas co-emperors.⁹⁹ Although the new emperors tried to negotiate a settlement, Robert Guiscard had no interest in peace and launched an invasion of the Byzantine Empire in 1081.

Robert Guiscard gathered an army of 30,000 including 1,300 of his own knights and after a series of naval battles against the fleets of the Byzantines and their Venetian allies, landed his invasion force at the Byzantine city of Dyrrachium in modern Albania.¹⁰⁰ Dyrrachium was at that time large and well-defended, with an able commander who managed to fight off the initial Norman assaults, "a never ending shower of arrows was directed at the Kelts [Normans] on the summit, and they unable to bear it any longer took cover."¹⁰¹ However, the repeated attacks were taking their toll on the defenders, so the city remained in danger. Even the city's Byzantine commander had "suffered serious wounds in different parts of his body; the worst was when an arrow penetrated near his temple."¹⁰² Alexius I Comnenus with an army of around 20,000 marched to meet Robert Guiscard's invasion and break the siege, while his reformed fleet succeeded in blockading the Norman beachhead. After some maneuvering, Alexius abandoned his initial plan of blockading the Norman camp from land and sea, and thus starving the Normans into submission.¹⁰³ Instead, he prepared to launch a night attack on the Norman camp from two sides, but was stymied when the Normans marched out to meet him and began forming up for battle. Robert Guiscard deployed his army in three divisions, with his son Bohemund on the left, the count of Giovinazzo on the right, and himself at the center; his 1,300 knights were positioned behind the infantry.¹⁰⁴

⁹³ Haldon, 167.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 93.

⁹⁵ Carey; Alltree; Cairns. *Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071.*, 132-133.

⁹⁶ Savvides, 37-38.

⁹⁷ Carey; Alltree; Cairns. *Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071.*, 157.

⁹⁸ Savvides, 39.

⁹⁹ Carey; Alltree; Cairns. *Road to Manzikert: Byzantine and Islamic Warfare 527-1071.*, 158-159.

¹⁰⁰ Haldon, 187.

¹⁰¹ Anna Comnena. Book IV, 143

¹⁰² Anna Comnena. Book IV, 142

¹⁰³ Haldon, 188-189.

¹⁰⁴ Haldon, plate 51.

Alexius also deployed his army in three divisions, placing Gregory Pakourianos on the left, and Nikephoros Melissenos on the right, while Alexius commanded the infantry at the center with the Varangian Guard formed a few yards ahead of the main body of infantry.¹⁰⁵ The battle began when, “Robert [Guiscard] sent a detachment of cavalry with orders to maneuver in such a way that some of the Romans [Byzantines] might be enticed from their line.”¹⁰⁶ However, the Byzantines were not drawn out, so the Norman right charged, and was counter attacked by the Byzantine left which put the Normans to flight.

As the count of Giovinazzo’s force fled before Gregory Pakourianos’ contingent, the Varangians abandoned their position to join in the pursuit. A detachment of infantry from the Norman center then attacked the exposed flank of the Varangians.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, the rest of the Byzantine and Norman armies moved to engage each other. Separated from the rest of the Byzantine army and caught on their exposed flank, the Varangian Guard was crushed and “the whole of the barbarian force [the Varangians] was massacred there.”¹⁰⁸ As the Varangian Guard was destroyed, Bohemund routed the Byzantine forces under Nikephoros Melissenos. The Norman right, which had earlier fled, was rallied by Robert Guiscard’s wife Sigelgeyta, when “she grasped a long spear and charged at full gallop against them. It brought them to their senses and they went back to the fight.”¹⁰⁹ Still the Byzantine forces under Alexius held firm and fought on. Robert divided his knights into smaller detachments which “charged and pushed back the Roman [Byzantine] line, in many places tearing it apart.”¹¹⁰ Unable to with stand these attacks, “some fell fighting on the field of battle, others looked to their own safety and fled.”¹¹¹ As his army dissolved around him, Alexius was set upon by three Norman knights; he barely managed to fight his way clear and escape.

In the aftermath of the battle, the city of Dyrrachium was left nearly defenseless. Its garrison had sortied out to take part in the battle, but was unable to reenter the city afterwards.¹¹² However, it was not until 1082 that city fell when, “Instigated by the colonists from Amalfi, and in obedience to their own advice, they opened the gates and allowed him [Robert Guiscard] to enter.”¹¹³ As the campaign dragged on, leadership of the Norman army passed to Bohemund. Robert Guiscard was forced to return to Italy to deal with a number of revolts and the German Emperor Henry IV, who was besieging Pope Gregory VII, a staunch Norman ally.¹¹⁴ Bohemund continued the drive toward Constantinople, and defeated Alexius in two other battles in which the emperor employed light wagons and then caltrops, in an attempt to break up the knights’ charge. Unable to face the Normans in open battle, Alexius resorted to diplomacy and convinced the Venetians to cut the Norman supply line to Italy with their powerful navy. He then negotiated the use of 7,000 horse archers from a Turkish sultan and was able to stop Bohemund at Larissa, in modern Greece.¹¹⁵ The death of Robert Guiscard in 1085 forced Bohemund to return to Italy, thus ending the Norman invasion of the empire.

The Battle of Dyrrachium magnificently demonstrates the full power of a well-timed charge by knights. Even Alexius had come to believe by the end of the campaign that “the first charge of Keltic [Norman] cavalry was irresistible.”¹¹⁶ During the battle the knights had been divided into smaller detachments and still managed to smash through the Byzantine infantry. Clearly, their combat effectiveness was not dependent on the size of their formations. They were just as effective in small groups as in one large combined unit.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁵ Haldon, 190.

¹⁰⁶ Anna Comnena. Book IV, 147.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 105.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 106.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 106.

¹¹⁰ Anna Comnena. Book IV, 148.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 110.

¹¹² Savvides, 55.

¹¹³ Anna Comnena, Book V, 155 These Italian colonists hailed from region that had been under Norman control for years, and likely had acquaintances in the Norman army.

¹¹⁴ Savvides, 56.

¹¹⁵ Savvides, 61.

¹¹⁶ Anna Comnena. Book V, 163.

¹¹⁷ Compare the effectiveness of the massed formations of knights at Civitate to the dispersed detachments at Dyrrachium. The knights were able to produce similar results, though in the first case they swept away the enemy formation and in the second they penetrated and broke it apart.

The power of their charge was such that it allowed them to defeat enemy forces which greatly outnumbered their own. Even at Larissa, a large Byzantine force confronted a smaller contingent of Norman knights and “The Kelts [Normans] charged against them without hesitation and killed up to 500 of them.”¹¹⁸ No army the Byzantines could field was capable of facing the Normans, or standing firm before their charging knights on its own. Completely defeated tactically, the Byzantines outmaneuvered the Normans strategically; they played one barbarian off against another, a time honored Byzantine strategy. Through shrewd diplomacy, the Byzantines were able to weaken the Normans by diverting their attention, cutting their supplies, and continuing to raise armies until the weakened Normans were driven out of the empire.¹¹⁹

Having examined the knightly military system in action at the battles of Civitate, Cerami, and Dyrrachium, against a variety of rival military systems, the advantages which allowed the knight to dominate the battlefield become clear. The knightly military system conferred on those who chose to employ it, tremendous advantages in terms of mobility, technology, and tactics. Horses and horsemanship were integral parts of knighthood, both of which increased the knight’s mobility on the battlefield.¹²⁰ Mounted on the back of a horse, a knight could move across the battlefield with relative ease; an advantage when attacking or retreating. Knights possessed a deadly combination of the most advanced offensive and defensive technology available. They were thus able to maximize the amount of damage they could inflict while also minimizing their own risk of harm. Tactically, knights were perfectly suited to the battlefields which confronted them. Massed formations were only effective as long as they maintained their cohesion, when the knights smashed through these formations that cohesion was lost, and the formation disintegrated.¹²¹ In the resulting chaos, the enemy could be easily put to flight and then run down.

The knightly military system also provided less tangible benefits in terms of discipline and morale. A knight required certain skills which could not be obtained overnight, and which once obtained would atrophy without regular practice.¹²² Therefore, knights underwent a long training period which, to some extent at least, instilled them with discipline. It was discipline which kept them from breaking rank to either flee or attack on their own, as well as conditioning them to follow orders. Perhaps even more important than discipline is morale. Knights were not unstoppable killing machines, they were susceptible to all manner of fears, doubts, panics, and surprises which would reduce their combat effectiveness and cause them to flee rather than risk death or injury.¹²³ The knight, seated astride his massive warhorse, able to strike down the enemy with near impunity, greatly increased the army’s self-confidence and morale, so that the men would not hesitate in battle.

As no military system is flawless, it is worthwhile to consider for a moment the inherent weaknesses of the knight as a military system. One such weakness was noted by Anna Comnena, “all Kelts [Normans] when on horseback are unbeatable in a charge and make a magnificent show, but whenever they dismount, partly because of their huge shields, partly too because of the spurs on their boots and their ungainly walk, they become very easy prey...”¹²⁴ Knights could be defeated by intentionally targeting their unarmored horses.

It is also worth taking into consideration the performance of the Swabians at Civitate, who, although massacred in the end, were remarkably successful in holding off the knights. This cannot be attributed to either their numbers, as they were outnumbered and became increasingly so as the battle wore on, or to their armament as they were predominately armed with swords, while the knights had much longer lances.¹²⁵ The Swabians were able to hold off the knights because of their discipline, they stood firm in a compact body and did not recoil from the charging knights. As historian John Keegan explains: “A horse, in the normal course of events, will not gallop at an obstacle it cannot jump or see a way through, and it cannot jump or see a way through a solid line of men. Equally, a man will not stand in the path of a running horse: he will run himself, or seek shelter, and only if exceptionally strong-nerved and knowing in its ways, stand his ground.”¹²⁶

¹¹⁸ Anna Comnena. Book V, 171.

¹¹⁹ Savvides, 68-69.

¹²⁰ Jones, 60.

¹²¹ Carey; Alltree; Cairns. *Warfare in the Medieval World.*, 6-9.

¹²² Jones, 68-73.

¹²³ John Keegan. *The Face of Battle.* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1976.), 68-72.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 118.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 49.

¹²⁶ Keegan, 95.

Infantrymen, when disciplined enough to stand firm, could repel charging knights by presenting the horses with an obstacle which they could not pass through and thus cause the horses to slow down or stop short of the infantry.¹²⁷ This equine tendency could then be exploited by the infantry, as cavalry which has become immobilized is incredibly vulnerable to attack. Yet, as was noted earlier, most infantry in the eleventh century was of dubious quality, therefore not likely to be disciplined enough to stand firm before the charging knights.

Since it required so much tactical control to employ the knights effectively, strategic thinking amongst the generals who led them was to some extent stunted; another weakness of this military system. In the majority of their Mediterranean campaigns the Norman knights never faced a general equal to their own, Alexius I Comnenus being the only notable exception. The knightly charge required careful timing and placement, if it was to inflict maximum damage on the enemy.¹²⁸ If a commander could not adequately control his knights the force of this charge was wasted, especially if the knights could not be recalled or redirected to another part of the battlefield.¹²⁹ Against a lesser commander, Alexius' wagons and caltrops probably would have succeeded in breaking up the knight's charge.¹³⁰ The overreliance on tactical command and control could become a weakness, since it often led to a neglect of strategy. That is not to say that those who employed the knightly military system were incapable of strategic thought, only that it was underdeveloped.¹³¹ Alexius was thus able to transform a series of tactical defeats into a strategic victory by attacking Bohemund's ability to keep his army and his knights in the field. This was a way of waging war that the knightly military system of the Normans could not match.

While 1066 and the Battle of Hastings may be long remembered as the epoch-making moment in the rise of the knight, only the Mediterranean provides an arena in which an historian can truly explore how, why, and what, made the knight such a popular and effective military system. While the processes which created the knight began in the tenth century, it was in the eleventh that the knight became part of a fully matured military system. Yet there remained a number of military systems which challenged the battlefield dominance of the knights. The Norman victory at Hastings demonstrated the superiority of the knightly military system over only one of its potential rival systems. The Norman campaigns in the Mediterranean therefore provide a wider variety of rival military systems against which the knightly military system may be evaluated. Tactics, mobility, technology, discipline and morale gave the Norman knights the edge they needed, at least when they had a competent commander, to sweep their enemies from battlefield after battlefield. It is also in this period when we see the first conceptualization of the Achilles' heel of the knight, his horse. Across Europe, bodies of disciplined infantrymen, long the knights' victims, would stand firm, and bring down charging knights by intentionally targeting their horses, but that, was in the future.

¹²⁷ "Nevertheless, accidents happen. Men, miscalculating or slow footed, and horses, confused or maddened, do collide, with results almost exclusively unpleasant for the man." Keegan, 95.

¹²⁸ Jones, 76.

¹²⁹ Jones, 52. Throughout Middle Ages numerous battles were lost, due to the tendency of the knights to lose cohesion as different units acted independently of each other. At Larissa Bohemund, carried away by his success, lost touch with the rest of his army and not only lost his camp but was in danger of being defeated in detail.

¹³⁰ There are examples from the campaigns of Belisarius to the Hussite wars of armies successfully employing all sorts of devices to break up charging cavalry or knights; including but not limited to wagons, caltrops, ditches, and wooden stakes.

¹³¹ J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340*. (Woodbridge UK: The Boydell Press, 1997), 348-349.

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