

## **Achieving Peace: An Organizational Analysis of the Implementation of the 1992 Salvadorean Peace Accords**

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### ***Introduction***

In an earlier work (Cox and Renderos, 2013) the influences of the dynamics of negotiations and bargaining on the implementation of the 1992 Salvadorean Peace Accords were examined. In that work we concluded that reforming a political system via peace accords is a difficult deed to accomplish, especially when the individual protagonists in the negotiations have a major stake in the result. By every measure the peace accords accomplished its central goals; an end to civil conflict and a shift toward a democratic foundation for politics. The accords are a success. In choosing to ignore certain issues, the political process, not the negotiators, inherited the task of policy making and policy resolution. The future is one of democratically addressing political issues. That is as it should be and may well be all that can be expected of the accords. The “incompleteness” of the implementation is now a matter of political decision-making and not one of the accords.

The above analysis hints at another dynamic at play—the interpersonal exchanges and perspectives that influenced the stances of the two “sides” in the negotiations. As will be suggested below, interpersonal and organizational factors influence the relationship within the bargaining teams, no less than across the table. The simple reality is that for both personal and institutional reasons one side in a negotiation is rarely as unified as would appear. Intra-group conflict is the everyday reality in negotiations. All intra-group disagreements generated by differences in interests among members of each negotiating party made it difficult to come to the negotiating table and agree to a peace agreement. The intra-group disagreements demonstrated that each group was not a homogeneous one. Even though each member was part of a greater group, not all had the same vision, goals, or interests in mind. Each member had personal, political, and organizational interests to pursue. Their differences had the positive effect of defining all members’ true vision, goals, and political ideology. In the end, all members successfully negotiated an ambiguously written peace accord which could be renegotiated at a later time.

To understand the complexity of the layers of relationships and ultimately the influence of those relationships on the Peace Accords as written and the implementation of those accords this analysis is anchored in the work of Graham Allison (Allison, 1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Using the Allison framework of three models serves as the basis for exploring the influence of intra-group dynamics on the Peace Accords and implementation of the accords. Before analyzing those dynamics we must first explore in more detail Allison’s three models and then briefly review how the accords unfolded and then the trajectory of implementation of the accords. We can then examine the evolution of the implementation of the accords, potentially explaining some of the barriers to completion of implementation and the political dynamics (and political changes) that have become part of that history.

### ***Allison’s Three Models***

The three models are as follows:

1. Model I-The Rational Actor Model
2. Model II-Organizational Process
3. Model III-Governmental Politics

Model I emerges from Political Science/International Relations in the 1940s. Put in its simplest form, Model I links purpose and action. It explains international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nation states or governments (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). It also explains events by imposing a rational outline to whatever event is being explained. This model requires as a pre-condition for analysis an intelligible and rational continuum regardless of the actors' motives, preferences, intellectual, and moral qualities (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). It explains the actors' behavior not as being an intelligent one but as motivated by a conscious, careful, and cunning estimate of the advantages the actors' behavior acquires (Schelling, 1960). What this means is that actor one influences the choices actor two makes and does so by influencing the expectations of actor two on how actor one will behave (Schelling, 1960).

Some of the lessons of Model I are:

- a. Explains international events by recounting nation states' or government's aims and calculations
- b. Imposes a rational outline when explaining an event
- c. Assumes the actor is rational when explaining an international event
- d. Explains actor's behavior as motivated by conscious, careful, and cunning estimate of advantages the actors' behavior acquires
- e. Assumes it is explaining an action
- f. Assumes behavior reflects purpose or intention from actor
- g. Assumes action taken is carefully drawn out decision to an issue

Model II offers the important insight that person's in organizations tend to follow patterns of behaviors that are endorsed by the organizations (i.e. are part of standard procedures and/or custom and culture). Miles Law, "where you stand depends on where you sit" whereby a person's understanding of a problem is shaped by the organization or profession to which a person is affiliated. The serio-comic story of Soviet and Cuban troops, who are nominally trying to keep the building of missile emplacements a secret and thus wore civilian clothing nonetheless lined up and marched to work each morning (Allison, 1971). Potentially more tragically he also recounts the decision of the Navy to disobey the direct order of the President on the naval blockade (the prevailing view was "we know how to do it right and no one, especially a former junior naval officer, can tell us different"). The result was that the first encounter by the US Navy of a Soviet ship occurred a full day earlier than President Kennedy desired because he wanted to give Khrushchev time to persuade his military to withdraw. The Navy allowed the President to believe that CIA intelligence on Soviet ship movements was at fault.

Some of the lessons of Model II are:

- a. Emphasizes processes and procedures of large organizations constituting a government
- b. Choices, decisions, and acts are considered as outputs from the broader organization
- c. Function with regular patterns of behavior
- d. Uses organizational outputs -standard operating procedures, repertoires of organizations- as units of analysis
- e. Predictions identify trends reflecting established organizations and its procedures and programs
- f. Repertoires and routines shape problem definition and therefore constrain the range of problems/solutions that are considered valid.

Model III can best be understood as government acting out a game in which each member first and foremost focuses on interests of their individual organization or profession (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Model III sees the actor not as a single unitary actor but rather many actors (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). These players act according to various national, organizational, and personal goals. This translates into players making decisions not necessarily rational and based on a single choice but rather by the "pulling and hauling that is politics" (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 255). Allison (1971) deftly uses the analogy of a game of chess in which each piece on both sides makes independent decisions with little regard to rules such as one-play at a time, per side.

To better understand Model III, and appreciate and explain why a particular governmental decision was made or why that government engaged in the behavior it did, it is necessary to identify the actors and "games," and know the coalitions, bargains, and compromises in which they engage. Government decision making is a complex process involving multiple participants in the process. In this process, there are certain characteristics of group decision making processes having consequences from the decision and actions emerging from the same (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

In other words, a wide array of causal factors must be taken into consideration when explaining results of group decision making.

Some of the lessons of Model III are:

- a. Sees each individual as a player in a competitive game, the game of “politics”
- b. Within government, bargaining among players, hierarchically positioned, takes place
- c. Consists of many actors as players, not a single unitary actor
- d. Players act according to national, organizational, and personal goals
- e. Decisions are not necessarily rational and are based on the game of politics

### ***Group Interactions According to Allison***

Allison’s (1971) models, taken together, offer insights into the internal dynamics and processes of any collective decision process. Four behavioral elements of the models are pertinent for this study:

1. Rational analytic methods have limited value in trying to interpret actions of multiple actors engaged in collective decision making. People do not necessarily act rationally (or at least rationally in the way the model defines rational).
2. Interpreting and implementing decisions is complicated because there will not necessarily be a singled, agreed-upon goal that drove the decision.
3. Routines and repertoires push groups toward judgments that reflect organizational and professional norms and priorities. Solutions to problems will be shaped by problem definitions which themselves come from those organizational and professional norms.
4. Persons who are nominally on the same side may nonetheless work at cross-purposes. Success will be defined differently by different actors; even those on the same side. Those actors will appear to change sides and even act against their own interests.

### ***The Accords: A Chronology<sup>1</sup>***

The parties to the negotiations – the government and the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] -- started negotiating the peace accords in September 1989, lasting until its consummation in January 16, 1992 (<http://kellogg.nd.edu/romero/PDF%27s/Chronology.pdf>). The first serious meeting in which both parties engaged was in September 1989. The second important meeting took place in Geneva in April 1990. This time the UN expressed an interest in getting the negotiating parties to agree on an accord; it was at this meeting that timelines and deadlines were discussed. The UN expressed a desire to act as a mediator in case the need arose. A month later (May 1990) a meeting took place in Caracas, Venezuela (<http://kellogg.nd.edu/romero/PDF%27s/Chronology.pdf>). During this meeting, the agenda and timeline was more clearly defined. Both parties met for the last time in New York in December 1991 to redefine what had already been negotiated and to produce the document that would be the peace accords. The meetings for negotiating the peace accords culminated in both parties signing them in Mexico City, Mexico on January 16, 1992 (<http://kellogg.nd.edu/romero/PDF%27s/Chronology.pdf>).

In part because of the scattered timing of the negotiations and in part because topics varied, the composition of the negotiators present at any location varied. Over time the number of negotiators on each side ranged from three to seven. Those attending changed from meeting to meeting but overtime there were at least three persons on both sides who were consistent participants. Such consistency was critical, particularly in 1990 and 1991 as work continued in between the formal sessions (Cox and Renderos, forthcoming). While the number of consistent participants was small, for purposes of this analysis that consistency also meant that the intra-group dynamic is similarly consistent.

### ***Toward A Democratic El Salvador***

The Peace Accords of 1992 ended what was several decades of intermittent conflict. The parties to the conflict negotiated with the constant pressure that the United Nations would intervene. A critical factor in approving the accords when they did was the anticipated move by the UN to step in to act as a mediator.

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<sup>1</sup>A more detailed examination of the chronology of events during the peace negotiations is found in Cox and Renderos (2013).

Neither side wanted that intervention (Cox and Renderos, 2013). Nevertheless, a United Nations Observation Team would play a major role in the transition process (Wood, 2001; 2002). From 1991 to 1995, the observers' mission in El Salvador was to mediate the peace process, verify human rights conditions throughout the state, ensure compliance with the peace accords by both parties, and institution building. There was also a significant amount of support on the part of individual states; bilateral and multilateral donors compromised themselves in providing financial support to facilitate the transitional peace process and the reconstruction of the country (Boyce, 1996; Orr, 2001).

The major challenge the Peace Accord posed for all Salvadoreans in the aftermath of the accords was reaching agreement on often ambiguous and other times scant language upon which to base an understanding of the intent of the signatories. Both parties interpreted the peace agreements according to whatever favored each. When both parties interpreted the peace accords according to their own interpretation and self-interests; significant delays ensued (Popkin, 2000). The Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz (COPAZ) (National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace) was charged of overseeing the implementation of the peace accords. Furthermore, to enforce the peace agreements between the parties, the commission was also in charge of verifying that each party live up to its responsibilities. In the event that both parties were not in accord with the commission's interpretation and enforcement of the peace agreements, the commission was granted authority to draft any necessary legislation it deemed appropriate. In some instances, behind closed doors negotiations between the FMLN and government representatives superseded whatever recommendations COPAZ made (Wood, 2001).

To move the peace transition forward, the government broke the close alliance it had with the military. It did not allow the military to have political influence. The government even asked military officials to withdraw and refrain from participating in politics. The peace accord affirmed the ban on military political participation as former guerrilla leaders made their way into the Salvadorean political arena (Stanley, 1996; Williams & Walter, 1997; Wood, 2001).

The other method of transitioning El Salvador to a democratic state was through the FMLN's political participation. The transition has been significant for the FMLN because prior to the 1994 elections, they were always pursuing their political agendas via insurgent movements. Almost a quarter of the nation's legislative assembly seats were controlled by the FMLN in their first elections as a legitimate political party. In the 1997 legislative assembly elections, again, the FMLN made headway as it won 27 seats in the legislature. This was a significant number of seats because the party in power at that time, ARENA, had beaten FMLN by only one seat. The ARENA party was able to garner 28 seats of the 84 seats up for competition (Wood, 2001).

The transition to democracy has been beneficial for the FMLN. It has been able to win many mayoral offices throughout the country. Since it began participating in competitive elections in 1994, the FMLN has successfully experienced an increase in winning mayoral offices. The party has been able to sustain a stronghold in the areas where it began and sought refuge, the mountains and remote areas of the country. The 2004 presidential elections were very intense for both major parties. Groups that had only infrequent involvement in elections became a factor in election outcomes (El Diario de Hoy, 2004). Young voters, male and female, younger than 30 years of age, made up a significant percentage in determining presidential election turnout (Cruz, 2004). In 2009, for the first time in Salvadorean history the country has a leftist government popularly elected. Mauricio Funes (FMLN) won with a total popular vote of 1,354,000 (51.32%) million votes while the ARENA candidate obtained 1,284,588 (48.60%) (Garcia, 2009).

### **Research Questions**

This study will apply the Allison (1971) models of group interaction (primarily intra-group interactions) to better explain the peace accords and implementation of the accords. For our purposes the questions to be addressed relate directly to the four behavioral elements of Allison's models presented above (page 6).

### **Analytic Methods**

Explanations of and critiques of the implementation of the peace accords suffer from a lack of information about how and why the accords came to be worded in the way they are. The only way to examine the dynamics of the group interactions that led to the Peace Accords is to get information from the source – persons from the two "sides" to the negotiations. Critically, some of those involved are no longer available. Also, the number of persons, who were participants throughout the process, was never large.

Fewer than fifteen persons met these criteria of being participants at some point in the negotiations. Two persons, one from each side of the negotiations who were long term participants were identified and agreed to be interviewed about the negotiations dynamics. Open-ended interviews of more than two hours each were conducted (in Spanish).

Allison used then newly released government documents as the starting point for studying the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are many public documents and academic studies chronicling the history of the peace accords. Further there have been studies of the progress toward implementation of the accords (see for example Doggett & Kircher, 2005; MacLeod, 2006; Renderos, 2011; Wood, 2001, 2002). The study makes use of that documentation in much the same way as Allison (1971), but looks for examples and evidence of Model II and Model III behavior during the negotiations and during the long period of implementation. More specifically the document review, supported and supplemented by the two interviews of key figures in the negotiations and implementation, will seek to uncover examples of the four behavioral elements restated below:

1. Rational analytic methods have limited value in trying to interpret actions of multiple actors engaged in collective decision making. People do not necessarily act rationally (or at least rationally in the way the model defines rational).
2. Interpreting and implementing decisions is complicated because there will not necessarily be a singled, agreed-upon goal that drove the decision.
3. Routines and repertoires push groups toward judgments that reflect organizational and professional norms and priorities. Solutions to problems will be shaped by problem definitions which themselves come from those organizational and professional norms.
4. Persons who are nominally on the same side may nonetheless work at cross-purposes. Success will be defined differently by different actors; even those on the same side. Those actors will appear to change sides and even act against their own interests.

### **Analysis**

Much of the early analysis conducted by academicians critiquing the accords and implementation used a Model I frame of reference (e.g. Arnson, 2003; Studemeister, 2001; Wood 2001, 2002). As noted in analysis by Cox and Renderos (2013) such analyses suffered from the same shortcoming that Allison (1971) suggested more than four decades ago. Future behaviors rarely follow the path anticipated based upon this framework. Motivations to act and the goals set by individuals are not always clear and to assume those goals based upon collective decisions with considerable peril. Both negotiating parties had issues of unity, consensus, and agreeing on all issues equally. The following paragraph details how interviewee two's group had difficulty in reaching consensus amongst its own group members.

Most importantly, however, was the lack of consensus, agreement, unity, and vision on the part of interviewee two's group. Interviewee two stated that one of the reasons why its group had problems with the negotiations' implementation was because there was a lot of disunity among the group (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). "Entre nuestro equipo de negociantes, teníamos desacuerdos entre nosotros de acordar la implementación de los acuerdos", stated interviewee two (Translation: Within our negotiating group, we had disagreements about the peace accords implementation). There were some members of the group that did not share the same vision with the rest of the group. What made matters worse, according to interviewee two, was "Habían unos miembros del grupo que tenían un extremo punto de vista de las negociaciones mientras otros tenían una mente más reformista y abierta." (Translation: There were some members of the group that had an extreme view of the negotiations while others were more open and reform minded) (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). Group disunity paved the way for the entire group's inability to arrive at comprehensive, achievable, and verifiable negotiations. While there were intra-group divisions in interviewee two's group such as some members taking extreme views of the negotiations while others showing a willingness to negotiate political reforms, the group itself nevertheless agreed to the themes negotiated (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010).

Some of interviewee one's group members were reluctant to negotiate with a rebel group, considered a threat to the country's democracy, but in the end decided to negotiate and agree to something because it was better than having a third party step in and conduct the negotiations for them (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009).

According to interviewee one, some members of this negotiating group did not want to sign the peace accords especially when they, also members of the armed forces, became aware that the opposing negotiating party proposed doing away with the armed forces (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009). Members of interviewee one's group managed to convince those opposed that the armed forces would continue to exist but would be relegated to its constitutional role of defending the country and its citizens. During the interview interviewee one stated that "Los miembros del equipo de negociaciones acordaron llegar a un acuerdo con lo escrito en los acuerdos de paz siempre y cuando quedara claro que las fuerzas armadas existieran mientras la republica existiera"(Translation: All negotiating members agreed to the peace accords' language as long as it remained clear in the accords that the armed forces would continue to exist as long as the republic existed) (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009).

Another reason why some of the members of interviewee one's group showed reluctance to sign the peace accords was because they did not want to grant their opposition legal status. The group worked out the peace accords' language stating that their opposition would transform from an armed group to a political party, a political subject (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009). The groups shifted from hard negotiating to soft negotiating because the language of the peace accords was worked in a manner satisfying the negotiating parties' interests. Below the reader can appreciate how the negotiations were slowed and even suspended because interviewee two's group could not agree on its own identity. By suspending the negotiations it slowed the negotiating process.

Interviewee two stated that all members belonging to her group had a long discussion about how to approach the language of the peace accords. The debate was "Si identificarnos como reformistas o revolucionarios en el lenguaje de los acuerdos de paz"(Translation: Whether to state in the peace accords in precise language whether we identified ourselves as reformists or revolutionaries) (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). As a group they suspended the negotiations not because they were not able to negotiate with their opposition, but because they were not able to agree as a negotiating group to the terminology in the negotiations (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). In order to come to terms with the precise language and definitions of what they wanted out of the negotiations, they suspended the negotiations in early 1991. This group never publicly admitted the true reason for suspending them,

Another debate creating friction among interviewee two's group was the issue of whether to state "Si usar la palabra Socialismo o Democracia en los términos y definiciones" (Translation: Whether to use the word Socialism or Democracy in the negotiations' terms and definitions). Some orthodox members wanted to use the term Socialism while others opted for Democracy in order to appear as reformists than as orthodox minded Socialists (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). During their group discussions, it turned out that this is where they found out what and where each member stood with their own political views. The group ended up using the term Democracy to express their views on how they wanted the reforms to take place. Not much debate could generate under the given circumstances due to the pressing need of sitting down and drafting the language of the peace accords in order to avoid interference from a third neutral party dictating the peace accords' language.

The creation of the Salvadorean peace accords posed a challenge for both negotiating parties. Drafting the language of the accords was a cumbersome task because it affected permanently the careers and livelihoods of those negotiating. Legitimately, all those involved in the negotiations had a stake in the outcome of the negotiations. Precisely for this reason, the accords had to be carefully drawn out in order to avoid causing any permanent deprivation of privileges enjoyed by those involved in and affected by the negotiations. Rightfully so interviewee one's members had controversial debates stemming from the disappearance of the armed forces (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009). To even consider their release from political control was enough for them to fiercely oppose their own partners.

Legally recognizing their opposition posed another challenging division among interviewee one's group. Some members of this group were reluctant to legally recognize their opposing side for political reasons (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009). Debating whether to create a strong future opposition was an offense to members of this group because it was exactly these same individuals that caused the political instability and interruptions the armed forces had long enjoyed (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009).

Initially opposed to recognizing the FMLN as a political opposition, they nevertheless ended accepting their existence. It may seem unimportant how an organization identifies itself, but when it comes to political struggles and ideology it amounts to something important because both define what the organization, movement, or group stands for and represents. Interviewee two's group identity was important because of its particular use of certain terminology identifying them indicated where they stood and what they represented. Meticulously choosing the right terminology posed another challenge among interviewee two's negotiating party (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). Democracy or Socialism, revolutionaries or reformists, revolution or reform, these words were dividing factors among interviewee two's group. Choosing the right words, terminology, and expressions were dividing factors among this party because not all members shared the same ideology or had similar political visions (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). In interviewee two's group, there were some hard line orthodox socialists while on the other extreme there were reform minded individuals (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). It revealed where each partner stood when it came time to address the language of the negotiations. Perhaps it was to be expected since this particular negotiating party formed several entities at one time in its prewar period.

What does all of this imply for purposes of this document? It shows that intra-group politics heavily influenced the peace accords' language. Taking extreme positions even within the same negotiating parties is indicative of the behavior Allison (1971) explains in Model III. Model III explains the behavior revealed of intra-group politics influencing the peace accords' language. Is there evidence of model III behavior in the intra-group negotiations from both parties? Is both parties' behavior engaging in bargaining and competitive games of politics? Is there more than one actor to each part involved in the negotiations? And, are they playing and looking out for their national, organizational, and personal interests? The answer to all of these questions is a simple yes answer.

Focusing on issues both parties encountered while deliberating the language of the peace accords, there is plenty of evidence that all four questions aforementioned are clearly answered when examining them through Allison's (1971) lens. The debate among interviewee one's negotiating party about dismantling and doing away with the armed forces shows that there was indeed intra-group conflict among those members wanting and agreeing to set the armed forces aside and return them back to their constitutional duty of defending the country and those refusing to even consider their reprieve from losing control of the entire political system as traditionally enjoyed over decades past. This type of behavior evidences members engaging in bargaining games (Personal interview with interviewee one, December 18, 2009). The fact that some opposed losing control of the socio-political hold of the country, while others supported the armed forces' rights as defenders of its borders, articulates well Allison and Zelikow's (1999) Model III. Allison and Zelikow (1999) explain Model III's behavior of bargaining among the members of interviewee one's group and the division on stance of the language of the accords. It sets apart each member or individual player taking part in the game of politics. Acting as a single individual instead of a unified group provides further evidence that within this particular negotiating party, each individual actor acted alone, competitively sought to secure its interests by first pursuing personal interests and second, their organizational ones.

The same is true of the interviewee two's group. Exactly the same framework applies to this group as it displayed bargaining behaviors among the members of the same group. Employing Socialist or Democratic terminology on the language of the peace accords was a challenge for this group because it was at this stage that each member begins to reveal its own personal, political ideological views (Personal interview with interviewee two, January 9, 2010). Here each individual actor engages in bargaining their positional stance by negotiating the language of the peace accords. Each actor does so by first acting as individuals with personal, organizational, and national interests then as one united negotiating party engaged in bilateral agreements. Evidently, all members engaged in playing a political game through bargaining its group identity.

What can we learn from the Allison's (1971) models? First, there is evidence of attempts at Model I, rational actor behavior throughout the negotiations process, but less during implementation. The ebb and flow of the negotiations to a large extent followed the "textbook" (Cox and Renderos, 2013), but at the same time that rational approach was sidetracked by other, often deeply personal, concerns. Model II behavior is not always easily captured by either the written documents or the interviews. Certainly, there are examples of Miles' Law being displayed, especially in the realization of the government that once the principal that negotiations were needed because neither side could "win" the war, then the role of the military as a negotiations partner became less critical.

In a someone different understanding of bureaucratic routine and standard operating procedures both sides seem to hold tight to images of a future democracy that looked much like the contradictory processes each side already endorsed. Both sides endorsed the goal of a democratic El Salvador, but without ever examining the wide gulf in democratic processes that term implied. To one side democracy meant land reform and a more egalitarian society. To the other it meant a new regime that affirmed the status quo by electing the elites who had been running the government.

There is considerable evidence of intra-group conflict (Model III behavior) that affected both the wording of the accords and affected the implementation. Tellingly, participants in the negotiations would seemingly “change sides” during implementation of the accords. As suggested earlier we see this less as changing sides and more that the views of some individuals could not be accurately gauged by the written documents. There was much disagreement within the groups. This often meant the accords left the topic for the implementers of the accords (Cox and Renderos, 2013), but it also meant that potential significant rifts within each side were covered over in the rush to get an accord signed.

### ***Conclusions***

Intra-group conflict and politics heavily influenced the language of the Salvadorean peace accords. It became evident that members from each party influenced the wording of the peace accords provisions. Each member in each side had to make sure that their interests were met. The way each had their interests met was by way of the wording of the peace accords provisions. There was nothing more important than employing the correct terminology, ambiguity, or otherwise in order to accomplish each members’ interests. What needs to be taken away from this controversy of employing ambiguous language in any peace accord is that intra-group politics plays a big part in peace negotiations. During the negotiations themselves, it is not only a matter of negotiating between two parties; there is more to it such as the dynamics of intra-group negotiations as well.

This study revealed that despite the many disagreements and negotiations amongst intra-group members and between the negotiating parties, there are still ways of negotiating a peace accord successfully. Once intra-group negotiations are resolved, the negotiating parties may engage in full negotiations of the peace accords. After negotiating amongst group members, negotiations between parties can indeed be effectively effectuated. Additionally, if both parties negotiate willingly, great accomplishments are achieved through negotiations. In the beginning stages of the negotiations, there were challenges due to all negotiating members having and pursuing their own personal interests. At first they did not see eye to eye with the rest of their group members. After careful intra-group negotiating, each part was able to come to the negotiating table and offer its proposals. Meeting at the negotiating table allowed both sides to move forward with the negotiations and eventually draft peace agreements conducive to a final peace accord.

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